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Autonomy: Toward the Social Self-
Governance of Reason 
 
 
Philip J. Rossi 




Interpretations of Kant’s notion of autonomy that are 
“relational”—that is to say, that locate its fundamental context in 
terms of an individual moral agent’s relationship to others in society—
are no longer as problematic as they once seemed.1 Still, the strength 
and persistence of a view that sees Kantian autonomy as 
“individualist,” or as standing in fundamental tension with the roles 
and relationships that are constitutive of an agent’s membership in a 
community, requires that an account be given of why a relational 
rather than an individualist reading more adequately represents Kant’s 
own view of autonomy.2 What I thus propose to do in this note is 
simply to provide what I consider to be one important indication that 
Kant deeply embeds both his understanding of reason and its moral 
function in the context of human social interaction. I shall do so by 
drawing attention to a passage from the Critique of Pure Reason—“The 
discipline of pure reason with regard to its polemical use” 
(A738/B767–A757/B785)—that is rarely given consideration in 
discussions of Kant’s moral thought, even though it bears quite directly 
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on the question of the extent to which there is a social character to his 
understanding of reason and the full range of its exercise.3 I draw 
attention to this passage precisely because I believe it offers useful 
support for the view that Kant sees autonomy as fundamentally—and 
appropriately—a function of a relationality that is proper to human 
moral agency.4 If this is so, then in proposing autonomy as the proper 
characterization of human moral freedom, Kant at least implicitly 
affirms it as the social character of the self-governance of reason—an 
affirmation that he will later more fully articulate in concepts such as 
the highest good, the ethical commonwealth, and the cosmopolitan 
perspective.  
Before looking at this passage and its import for a relational 
understanding of autonomy, it will be useful to consider some of the 
factors that lie behind the strength and persistence of an individualist 
reading of this concept. While it may be the case that some of these 
factors have their origin in the cultural dynamics of the individualism 
that has arisen from more than two centuries of interplay between 
democratic polities with market and consumer economies, the ones 
most pertinent to my argument are those which can be located within 
Kant’s own texts. The strength and the persistence of this individualist 
reading has its origin in the fact that Kant does treat the notion of 
autonomy in ways that do provide a basis for it. There is no doubt, for 
instance, that Kant takes autonomy to be crucial to the full integrity of 
the individual choices that one makes as a moral agent: if we are to 
exercise autonomy, no one else can do our choosing for us. There is 
also little doubt that in the Kantian texts which have become standard 
reading for courses in ethics—most notably the second part of The 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals—Kant does not make it all 
that evident, save in the image of the kingdom of ends, that autonomy 
can be, let alone should be, appropriately rendered as an account of 
the social self-governance of reason. He offers what has often been 
taken to be a picture of moral decision-making in which an individual 
moral agent makes choices that seem not to be at all affected by the 
concrete features of our human condition, such as one’s relation to 
other human beings in the specific society of which one is a member. 
One makes one’s decisions as an abstract member of a timeless 
“intelligible world” standing, at best, in an abstract, formal relation 
with an equally abstract set of fellow members of that world.5  
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The strength of this individualist reading of Kant’s notion of 
autonomy, however, rests to a large degree, first, on detaching the 
arguments of the Groundwork from the larger conceptual structure of 
Kant’s critical project and, second, on taking this text as Kant’s 
definitive statement on moral philosophy. What the Groundwork 
represents, however, is an intermediate—albeit quite significant—
exposition of a still developing account of moral life that undergoes 
further refinement and even significant revision for more than another 
decade. One consequence of this isolation of the concepts and 
arguments of the Groundwork from both their systematic context in 
the critical project and their place in the historical development of 
Kant’s thinking is that this text is read without reference to his first 
efforts to envision the form and function of a critical exposition of 
morality in the first Critique, or indeed to his later treatments, 
sometimes strikingly different from those in the Groundwork, of the 
same central issues in other texts from the late 1780s and throughout 
the 1790s. When the Groundwork is read in the wider context provided 
by other major texts from different stages of Kant’s exposition of the 
critical project, however, one begins to see the lineaments of a more 
complex account of moral agency and autonomy than that provided by 
individualist readings focused principally on this one work. One striking 
way in which the picture becomes more complex is that reference to 
this larger array of texts brings into higher relief the social 
embeddedness of moral agency and autonomy that Kant only hints at 
in the text of the Groundwork with the image of the “kingdom of 
ends.”  
A key initial point of reference for Kant’s earlier efforts to 
provide a critical exposition of morality is a passage from the “Canon 
of Pure Reason” (A 808/B 836) in which Kant first defines a “moral 
world” as “the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all 
moral laws (as it can be in accordance with the freedom of rational 
beings and should be in accordance with the necessary laws of 
morality).” He then refers to the “objective reality” of this world as an 
“object of reason in its practical use” and “a corpus mysticum of the 
rational beings in it, insofar as their free choice under moral laws has 
thoroughgoing systematic unity in itself as well as with the freedom of 
everyone else.” A few pages later he further explains the 
interconnectedness of the agents in this “moral world” by reference to 
Leibniz’s concept of a “realm of grace”: 
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Leibniz called the world, insofar as in it one attends only to 
rational beings and their interconnection in accordance with 
moral laws under the rule of the highest good, the realm of 
grace, and distinguished it from the realm of nature, where, to 
be sure, rational beings stand under moral laws but cannot 
expect any successes for their conduct except in accordance 
with the course of nature in our sensible world. Thus to regard 
ourselves as in the realm of grace, where every happiness 
awaits us as long as we ourselves do not limit our share of it 
through the unworthiness to be happy, is a practically necessary 
idea of reason (A 812/B 840). 
These passages anticipate elements that eventually will enter into 
Kant’s account of critique as the social self-governance of reason—for 
example, the kingdom of ends, the object of practical reason, radical 
evil, the formulation of the universal principle of justice. They also 
suggest, as well, some problems that recur in his later development of 
that account—for instance, the moral function of the ends of action, 
moral “weakness” and “impurity” in relation to “radical evil,” and, most 
notably, the relation between nature and freedom in terms of what he 
calls here the “realm of nature” and the “realm of grace”—not all of 
which he is later able to bring to a satisfactory resolution. Of the 
elements in these passages, the ones that I believe bear most directly 
upon an articulation of the social character of autonomy are those 
which express Kant’s understanding both of the unity of reason and of 
the comprehensive unifying dynamic of reason, an understanding that 
he images and conceptualizes in terms such as “world” and “realm” (or 
“kingdom”).  
To understand how Kant’s use of this terminology bears on the 
notion of autonomy as the social self-governance of reason, it is crucial 
to recall that Kant takes reason itself to be a mark of the 
interrelatedness of the beings who exercise it. Put in most direct 
terms, any “world” that human reason constructs will have to have the 
character of being a social world. Kant gives clear affirmation of this in 
the first Critique, in the second section of the first chapter of the 
“Doctrine of Method,” a discussion that carries the title, “The discipline 
of pure reason with regard to its polemical use.” Two passages are of 
particular relevance, since they each use the establishment and 
operation of civic order in society as an extended image for the critical 
use of reason. The first is the opening paragraph of the section: 
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Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and 
cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition 
without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a 
disadvantageous suspicion. Now there is nothing so important 
because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted 
from this searching review and inspection, which knows no 
respect for persons. The very existence of reason depends upon 
this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose 
claim is never anything more than the agreement of free 
citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, 
indeed even his veto, without holding back (A738–39/B 766–
67). 
The second passage is part of a later discussion in the same section in 
which Kant offers a defense of what he will later term the “public use 
of reason”: 
Without this [the critique of reason as the true court of justice], 
reason is as it were in the state of nature, and it cannot make 
its assertions and claims valid or secure them except though 
war. The critique, on the contrary, which derives all decisions 
from the ground rules of its own constitution, whose authority 
no one can doubt, grants us the peace of a state of law, in 
which we should not conduct our controversy except by due 
process. What brings the quarrel in the state of nature to an end 
is a victory, of which both sides boast, although for the most 
part there follows only an uncertain peace, arranged by an 
authority in the middle; but in the state of law it is the verdict, 
which since it goes to the origin of the controversies itself, must 
secure a perpetual peace (A751–52/B 779–80). 
As Onora O’Neill ably argued, the juridical and political imagery 
that runs deeply throughout Kant’s writings needs to be taken as a 
particularly revealing clue to his thinking about the nature and function 
of human reason.6 The passages just cited from the first Critique offer 
just such a clue. They indicate that we would not be far off the mark in 
taking Kant to understand critique as the very process by which reason 
(freely) brings itself to be exercised socially—and consequently to 
understand autonomy as the exercise of the freedom by which reason 
acknowledges and takes upon itself the task of being governed 
socially. If this is so, there is all the more reason to agree with 
O’Neill’s assessment that autonomy is at the very heart of critique and 
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to urge, perhaps even more strongly than she does, that critique is 
itself a social task:  
Critique of reason is possible only if we think of critique as 
recursive and of reason as constructed rather than imposed. The 
constraint on possibilities of construction is imposed by the fact 
that the principles are to be found for a plurality of possible 
voices or agents who share a world. Nothing has been 
established about principles of a cognitive order for solitary 
beings.7  
A similarly strong and explicit stress on the social character of 
reason, however, is not immediately evident in the Groundwork—
although I believe one could argue that it is implicit in the confidence 
that Kant exhibits throughout that work and, indeed, throughout his 
moral philosophy in the reliability of ordinary moral judgment.8 In the 
development of his arguments in the Groundwork, Kant’s explicit focus 
simply is on matters other than the way in which the newly introduced 
concept of autonomy expresses the fundamentally social character of 
reason. Yet it not difficult to find key elements in his arguments at 
least presuppose, if not explicitly confirm, the social character of this 
moral exercise of reason. A particularly clear statement of this is in the 
affirmation of morality as “the lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of 
ends is possible”9 —a description that, in slightly different terminology, 
echoes what he had written in the “Canon of Pure Reason” about the 
social character of the world that is to be effected by the moral 
exercise of reason. In characterizing the moral exercise of reason as 
autonomy, Kant quite evidently highlights the fact that responsibility 
for the appropriate moral exercise of reason rests squarely in the 
hands of individual moral agents—and this is the aspect of his 
discussion that gives much of the persuasive power to what I have 
termed “individualist” understandings of autonomy. Yet by affirming, 
in the concept of autonomy, each individual agent’s responsibility for 
the exercise of reason, Kant neither denies nor weakens his prior 
claims about the social character of reason. His strong affirmation of 
individual responsibility here, moreover, does bring to light an issue 
that plays a role in his later development of the notion of the “highest 
good.” That issue is the precise character of the bearing that an 
individual’s appropriate exercise of moral reason then has upon 
effecting the highest good in its social form. Full exploration of that 
issue, which I believe would further bolster the claim that Kant takes 
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the full scope of autonomy to consist in the social self-governance of 
reason, lies beyond the scope of this note.  
Notes 
 
1See, for instance, Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 374: “Kant holds that just because 
‘thinking for oneself’ claims universal rational validity, this thinking 
must also strive to ‘think from the standpoint of everyone else,’ which 
is possible for beings like ourselves through free communication 
between people…I submit that any interpretation of Kant that takes 
account of his conception of reason as grounded on public 
communication must display Kantian autonomy as intersubjective 
already.”  
2The controversy between “liberals” and “communitarians” over a range of 
questions in political and social philosophy is one place in which this 
kind of issue has been recently been played out—though usually 
without much consideration of the question as to whether the concepts 
and arguments employed by either of the contending views adequately 
represent Kant’s own thinking about autonomy. Both sides have 
commonly taken it for granted that Kant’s reading of moral agency—
and, a fortiori, the autonomy which is its central conceptual element—
has a deeply ingrained individualist cast to it (or, as some parties to 
the controversy have termed it, that it provides a “thin” account of 
moral agency.)  
3The Critique of Pure Reason is cited by use of the standard convention of 
referring to the first (A) and second (B) editions of the German text. 
Translations are from Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Allen Wood, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant 
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
4In the “Introduction” to their translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Paul 
Guyer and Allen Wood draw attention to this section as one that 
“provides an ardent defense of freedom of public communication” and 
that also “presages Kant’s impassioned defense of freedom of thought 
in his political writings of the 1790s” (p. 19). Their notice of this 
passage suggested to me that it may also have bearing on Kant’s 
account of autonomy.  
5See, for instance, Iris Murdoch’s classic portrait of the “Kantian” moral agent 
in The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Shocken, 1971), 79–80, which 
concludes: “Kant’s man had already received a glorious incarnation 
nearly a century earlier in the work of Milton: his proper name is 
Lucifer.” In a less dramatic vein, Martha Nussbaum, in commenting on 
John Rawls’ Kantian construal of moral agency, observes: “This 
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interpenetration between person and nature is not imagined as going 
very deep, in the sense that once necessary things are at hand, all is 
well. No deeper consideration of the structure of relatedness between 
persons and things—or, indeed, persons and one another—is called for 
by the Kantian idea of the person” (“Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in 
Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and 
Henry S. Richardson [London/New York: Routledge, 1990], 203–52, at 
243).  
6See “Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise,” in Onora O’Neill, 
Constructions of Reason (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 3–27.  
7Ibid, 27.  
8See Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory (Cambridge/New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4–6.  
9Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant, Practical 
Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 84. The passage cited can be found in Kant’s Gesammelte 
Schriften, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–), IV, 434. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
